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Abstract 
The number of microfinance institutions in the developing world has 
exploded since their earliest modern incarnations began to appear in the early 
1980s.1  The highly publicized successes of Muhammad Yunus and the 
Grameen bank have placed microcredit, and associated financial services for the 
poor, in the spotlight in much of the development community literature.  The 
designation of 2005 as The Year of Microcredit, followed by the awarding of the 
2006 Nobel Peace Prize to Yunus and Grameen Bank have increased 
awareness on the part of a larger audience as well.  This paper will examine 
some key issues discussed in the literature on microfinance against the backdrop 
of the larger debates over the traditional top-down approach to foreign aid 
practiced by most Western governments and multilateral organizations like the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  The increasing 
popularity of the bottom-up, or grass-roots, approach to poverty alleviation and 
other social goals as practiced by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as 
exemplified by the microfinance movement, is in part a recognition of the failure 
of historical macrolevel policies to effect significant improvements in the lives of 
the poor in the developing world.1  However, the effort by the World Bank and 
others to promote their own vision of poverty reduction is played out in the 
debate over microfinance practices and in the discussion about the role of NGOs 
in development.  Finally, some specific cases of successful microfinance 
organizations will be presented in order to illustrate how the controversies in the 
field are addressed in practice. 
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Microfinance: Controversy and Promise 
Depending on the methodology used, the estimated number of total 
microfinance borrowers to date ranges from 133 million to 190 million, as 
documented by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP).2  As of 2007, 
the Grameen Bank alone had lent over six billion U.S. dollars to over seven 
million poor people in Bangladesh.3  According to their website, that loan figure 
has now reached over seven and a half billion dollars.4  As impressive as these 
numbers are, there is still plenty of room for growth.  CGAP indicates that there 
are currently about three billion people living on less than two dollars a day.2  Of 
those, 1.2 billion (40%) are destitute, living on the equivalent of less than one 
U.S. dollar per day.5  In order to achieve a CGAP goal of providing microcredit 
access to thirty percent of low income entrepreneurs by 2025, lending levels will 
need to reach an estimated $90 billion.6 
As would be expected with any promising intervention in the development 
community, there are a number of areas open to debate as to how microfinance 
programs should be managed and structured.  The main issue has centered 
around whether or not microfinance institutions (MFIs) should be financially self 
sustainable or whether donor subsidization will continue to be necessary in order 
to reach significant numbers of the poorest.  Another crucial consideration has 
been the question of what other services, if any, should be included along with 
credit, savings and other purely financial services.  I should point out that, not 
surprisingly, these two controversies are closely linked.  Underlying the debate 
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over both of these issues, however, and the key to understanding them, is the 
question of whether MFIs should use an institution-building or poverty-lending 
focus.1  This question will be explained in the following paragraph.  Also central 
to these discussions, and interwoven throughout, is the question of how well 
MFIs perform when it comes to reaching those living in the deepest level of 
poverty, as defined above.  Another concern is how committed MFIs are to 
supporting women‟s empowerment.  Answers to these questions are dependent 
on the ability to evaluate the effectiveness of the microfinance organizations in 
question in achieving their stated goals, as well as to the underlying assumptions 
embedded in the arguments.  
It may be obvious from the preceding paragraph that the various issues 
can be difficult to separate.  Perhaps a bit of history would be helpful here.  From 
what I have been able to determine, the earliest and deepest rift7 in the 
microfinance movement, was between the “welfarists” and the 
“institutionalists.”1,8,9  (Some writers use the term „institutionists‟ rather than 
„institutionalists‟; I will use institutionalists throughout this paper.)  The 
institutionalists have an exclusive focus on the structure of the organization.  
Institutional financial sustainability and large scale operations are their stock in 
trade.  The larger the organization, the more poor people they can reach, and 
therefore the greater the potential for impact.10  In order to stay in business and 
reach more people, they must be profitable because, they assert, they “cannot 
depend on governments and donors as reliable, long-term sources of subsidized 
funding.”6 The institutionalists view subsidized programs as necessarily 
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inefficient, according to their reasoning, and assert that they will tend to fail 
before they can have an impact on borrowers.6  The role of donors is only to 
“underwrite the commercialization” of the financial institution until it is able to be 
self-sufficient, which should be no longer than three to seven years.6,10,11  One of 
the strategies that the institutionalists recommend in order to achieve 
sustainability is to charge higher than market interest rates.  This allows the MFI 
to recover its transaction costs which are comparatively high because of small 
loan size.  In a 1996 paper published by CGAP, and designed to help MFIs set 
interest rates high enough to achieve profitability, the author points out that even 
MFIs that charge excessively high interest rates have much more demand than 
they can meet.  Therefore, he argues, it is safe to assume that borrowers earn 
enough to be able to afford to pay a high rate of interest.12  CGAP agrees.11 
The welfarists, on the other hand, are people focused.  They are 
interested in the well-being of individuals, families and communities.  They also 
believe that there is a moral, or spiritual, element to be considered, and fear that 
too much focus on financial performance will create a profit mentality at the 
expense of the social mission.8  The welfarists maintain that because the 
underlying purpose of microfinance is poverty alleviation, a key focus of financial 
services must be to reach the very poorest, a strategy that is called “depth of 
outreach.”  Another key metric is “breadth of outreach,” which is the number of 
borrowers reached.  While the welfarists agree that financial sustainability is a 
worthy goal, they do not agree that an organization that is NOT financially self-
sufficient is unequivocally unsuccessful or inefficient, especially if success comes 
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at the cost of neglecting the poorest.8,9  Instead they hold a general belief that a 
social return on a social investment is just as valuable to social investors, or 
“social entrepreneurs,” as a financial return, if not more so.3,8  The welfarists do 
not insinuate that the institutionalists do not care about people; they acknowledge 
that the aims of the two groups are the same.  However, they express a grave 
concern that institutionalists “insist that all MFIs adopt institutionalist values and 
„best practices‟, to attempt active suppression of the welfarists point of view,” and 
exhibit “hegemonic aspirations”8 in that their literature lays out a set of strict 
performance standards.6,8  Welfarists espouse the view that there is room for 
flexibility, a need for a number of different models, depending on the political, 
social and economic environment.8,9 
Unfortunately for the welfarists, and despite the fact that there were those 
who poked giant sized holes in the institutionalists arguments,7,8 it seems the 
cards were stacked in favor of the latter.  Woller, et al, note that:  
Institutionists have aggressively evangelized the microfinance 
community to have their views adopted, and they have enjoyed much 
success. That prominent institutionists have occupied at times key 
positions at the World Bank, CGAP, and USAID has greatly aided 
their cause, as has the impressive body of literature produced by 
institutionist writers. The influence of institutionist thought is clearly 
evident in that institutionists terms and concepts (e.g., sustainability, 
outreach, subsidy, subsidy dependence index, and best practices) 
have become the lingua franca of the microfinance industry.8 
 
No doubt donors, faced with the realities of finite resources, were all too happy to 
hear that they should not subsidize MFIs indefinitely.  Many writers draw 
connections between the unfettered free market philosophy espoused by the 
World Bank and the microfinance good practice guidelines promoted by 
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CGAP,11,13 an organization that is housed at the Bank.  Woller‟s reference to the 
relationship between the Bank and the philosophy of microfinance is relevant as 
well.  I shall explore this relationship further in a later section.  In any event, the 
debate over the financial self sustainability issue was “largely resolved” in favor 
of the institutionalists by the turn of the century.14 
 Although the “best practices” approach of the institutionalists has gained 
supremacy, the sustainability debate has continued in another form.  As I 
mentioned above, another key controversy centers on minimalist versus 
integrated microfinance programs.  The minimalists, who look a lot like 
institutionalists, argue, convincingly enough, that incorporating services aside 
from core financial services adds cost to programs and jeopardizes the 
institution‟s prospects of becoming, and remaining, self-sufficient.  Their 
argument rests on the assumption that having access to financial services will 
automatically create positive impacts in the lives of borrowers.8  Because most 
borrowers are female, women‟s empowerment is by extension also an automatic 
outcome of access to credit. Those who advocate for an integrated approach 
disagree.  The poorest in society are not merely economically disadvantaged; 
inexperience in entrepreneurial activity and the resulting lack of self-confidence 
are just as limiting, as are illiteracy and social isolation.1  As one author said, 
“without other inputs than credit, a great many micro-loan recipients have 
enormous difficulty making productive use of these small loans.”15  Integrated 
services generally means offering educational programs, usually starting with 
basic business skills, but also including health and nutrition, sanitation, family 
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planning, gender equity, HIV/AIDS prevention and political participation.  Some 
integrated programs do not stop at education; they also offer their clients 
products and services at a free or reduced rate.  BRAC Bangladesh, for example, 
is a massive organization offering services in the areas of economic 
development, education, health promotion, human rights, legal services, social 
development, agriculture, and the environment.16  They accept funding from 
multiple donors, and the scope of their reach is phenomenal; 110 million people 
served annually by over 51,000 full-time employees.16  Not only are they 
considered to be wildly successful despite their “dependence” on donor aid, they 
are able to supplement that funding with their microfinance revenues.17  
Grameen Bank on the other hand is both integrated and financially self-
sufficient.3,4 
The aims of integrationists appear to be two-fold.  First, they want to 
capitalize on the popularity of microfinance to reach a captive audience, mostly 
women, with public health messages and information.  Most microcredit is based 
on group lending, which involves weekly meetings at which group members 
make payments and share successes and challenges.  These meetings are 
perfect opportunities to expose women to information, resources and practices 
that will benefit not only them, but also their families.  The second aim of the 
integrated approach, as noted above, is to address the readiness of those at the 
deepest levels of poverty to make effective use of microcredit.  The education 
programs that impart business and finance skills address this directly.   
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The minimalists do not deny the value of these services, but they have 
questioned the ability of MFIs to offer them while remaining financially self-
sufficient.  Some studies point to the Grameen Bank, the Foundation for 
International Community Assistance (FINCA) village banks, and Freedom from 
Hunger‟s Credit with Education as examples of how an integrated program can 
do both successfully.3,17-19  Others cite studies showing that a clear trade-off 
exists between financial self-sufficiency and targeting the poorest.20  The 
remaining welfarists still insist that some subsidization may be necessary and 
even desirable, pointing to the social returns on investment that can be 
gained.1,8,9  In response to continued criticism, the minimalists have advocated 
for a “graduated” approach whereby the poorest are linked to basic social 
programs where they can receive education and other support services, and 
sometimes access to very small cash loans.  A CGAP paper on the “graduated” 
approach supports the minimalist philosophy; it asserts that: 
safety net services are quite different from the skills needed to deliver 
credit and other financial services.  For these and other reasons, MFIs 
should not try to deepen their outreach by offering safety net services 
along with financial services…the MFI simply coordinates with the 
safety net program to recruit successful „graduates‟ as customers.21  
 
This recommendation, however, assumes that there are safety net services to be 
had.  Perhaps recognizing this, the CGAP article goes on to say that some MFIs 
offer safety net services through a non-financial arm of the organization.  
However, they only recommend this in the case of an MFI “whose core business 
is operating so solidly and sustainably that it can afford to have its management 
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and staff resources diluted.” 21  Still, the majority of MFIs are institutionalist and 
minimalist, and success is measured by the balance sheet. 
The argument concerning the minimalist versus the integrated approach is 
far from resolved even now.  A large part of the problem in settling the debate 
has been the lack of clear measurements of success.  There has been, therefore, 
a tremendous effort on the part of many researchers to develop impact 
assessment methodologies that would answer the question of impact and much 
has been written on the topic.  The challenges are many and complex and I have 
neither the space nor the skill to enumerate them here.  However, for further 
reading on the subject, see (Afrane, 2002; Buckley,1997; Carlton, Manndorff, 
Obara, Reiter, & Rhyne, 2001; Copestake, Dawson, Fanning, McKay, & Wright-
Revolledo, 2005; Helms & Mosley, 1996; Hulme, 2000; Lafourcade, Isern, 
Mwangi, & Brown, 2005; Mayoux, 2005; Morduch, 1998; Morduch, 1999; 
Sebstad & Chen, 1996.)   Suffice it to say that a great deal of energy and 
attention has been put into developing reliable methods of evaluation, and 
significant progress has been made. 
It is important to understand, however, why the program evaluation and 
metrics are so critical, beyond the obvious desire for an evidence-based 
evaluation to satisfy donors (or investors, if you will).  The short answer is the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), adopted in the year 2000 at the UN 
Millennium Summit.22  The number one priority of the MDGs is the eradication of 
extreme poverty and hunger; specifically, the goal is to (1) cut the number of 
people living on less than a dollar a day in half by 2015, and (2) halve the 
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number of people suffering from hunger.  In order to achieve that level of poverty 
alleviation, one first has to have accurate poverty metrics in order to identify the 
target population; then there must be effective intervention programs to improve 
their circumstances.  The numbers quoted earlier in this paper, the hundreds of 
millions of borrowers served, make it clear that microfinance represents a clear 
opportunity.  Despite the massive numbers of people being reached by 
microfinance institutions whose lives have improved dramatically, the ability of 
many of these organizations to reach the poorest has been limited.  Needless to 
say, there has been a great deal of accusations and recriminations around 
whether this is so, why it is so, and what is to be done about it.  For many years, 
institutions claiming to reach the poorest used questionable measurements.  The 
minimalist approach to outreach performance metrics, for example, involved 
reporting the number of loans to indicate breadth (pure numbers) and loan size to 
indicate depth (reaching the poorest).  Smaller loan size, they asserted, was an 
indicator of income.  Therefore, they attested that making very small loans 
indicated an organization was achieving depth of outreach.9,10,23,24  Although it 
was widely used, this methodology was nonetheless criticized by many.5,7,9  It 
should be pointed out that, as mentioned earlier, good quality impact assessment 
methodologies were hard to find.  As one institutionalist said, “if programs 
evaluations can be freed from the burden of proving that finance matters…they 
can concentrate on evaluating the quality of the services and their institutional 
settings.” 25  Those who are more interested in the impact on people (the 
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welfarists) argued that “the ultimate test of any institution is not whether it exists 
or sustains itself, but whether it manages to do something useful.”26 
In June, 2003, the U.S. congress passed legislation calling for the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) “to develop and certify two or 
more cost-effective poverty measurement tools that measure $1 a day poverty,” 
and required that any organization receiving funding for microenterprise 
development use one of those tools as well as “report the number of entering 
clients who start below $1 a day.”  This reflected a “long-standing Congressional 
commitment to have at least half of USAID microenterprise funds benefit very 
poor clients.”5  According to the State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign 
(MCS) Report 2004, over 700 elected officials from the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Australia, India, and Mexico subsequently wrote a 
letter to the World Bank, CGAP, several regional development banks and the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP).  They called for the World Bank 
to adopt one of these tools, to duplicate the reporting requirement in order to 
encourage more depth of outreach, to provide annual reporting on the results, 
and, finally, to double its funding relative to microfinance, which was at that time 
less than 1% of its total annual resources.  There was evidently a great deal of 
resistance on the part of these agencies to complying with these requests, 
although James Wolfensohn, president of the Bank, responded: 
I very much agree with your observation that microfinance has a 
demonstrated, powerful impact in improving the livelihood of the poor, 
and a crucial role in reducing poverty.  Access to financial services for 
the poor is a critical condition for the attainment of the Millennium 
Development Goals.5   
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MCS published the response of the World Bank and CGAP to that letter and the 
subsequent exchanges between World Bank/CGAP representatives and those of 
MCS, which included two microfinance industry leaders, Muhammad Yunus of 
Grameen Bank and Fazle Abed of BRAC.  The World Bank/CGAP put forth 
several arguments, some of which, according to MCS, were contradicted by its 
own internal sources.  Their central argument was based the assertion that new 
requirements would place an undue burden on the financial sustainability efforts 
of member institutions in their portfolio.  The MCS respondents pointed out that 
the most comprehensive impact study done to date had been by a World Bank 
researcher who found that “microfinance helps reduce extreme poverty much 
more than moderate poverty.”5  Another study demonstrated that “financial self-
sufficiency and depth of outreach are not inherently dichotomous.”19   
Four years, many more letters, the support of 600 more officials, one 
congressional meeting and two (World Bank) presidents later, the World Bank 
still has not adopted these suggestions.27  Although this may seem shocking, 
many are not surprised.  Delegates at the 2004 Klaus Schwab Social 
Entrepreneur Summit in Brazil were asked to vote on a list of interventions that 
might be used to support their efforts, one of which was a World Bank study of 
their work.  That option received the fewest votes.  To the members who were 
surprised by this, one delegate responded that the World Bank, as a 
representative of the “system,” would more likely be one of the barriers they had 
to overcome in order to achieve “large scale, systemic and sustainable social 
change.”27  These social entrepreneurs, or “visionary rule-breakers,”27 clearly see 
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institutions like the World Bank as impediments to social change.  Their 
sentiments echo those of the author of the State of the Microcredit Summit 
Campaign 2007 report, who laments that while the Bank and its critics debate, 
there are 26,500 children who die every day from preventable causes.27  
Given the global focus on the MDGs, the support for targeting the poorest 
even in the U.S. congress, and the bad press it has evidently received,27 it might 
be important to ask why the World Bank, whose stated mission includes “working 
for a world free of poverty,” apparently continues to take an obstructionist 
position.  
 
Foreign Aid    
It is not just activists, grass-roots organizations and “visionary rule-
breakers” who are skeptical of the commitment on the part of Western 
governments and mammoth aid institutions to effect positive change in the 
developing world.  In a 2005 article in the Cato Institute‟s Economic Development 
bulletin, several African economic and political analysts stated that the “record of 
Western aid to Africa is one of abysmal failure,…the campaign has become a 
theater of the absurd – the blind leading the clueless.”28  These are harsh words, 
but the figures are indeed disturbing.  Ayodele, et al, go on to say that aid is a 
significant factor in the reduction of the standard of living in Africa over the last 
decades.  Much foreign aid has gone to corrupt government officials who exploit 
the resources for personal gain, undermining the potential for economic growth 
and prosperity.28,29  It has even been suggested that foreign aid promotes 
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corruption in that it injects resources into the system for which opposing factions 
then compete.29  Large numbers of donor funded projects, each of which requires 
administrative oversight and reporting, have strained government bureaucracies.  
As a result, tasks typically performed by civil servants are being co-opted by 
donor teams, often employed by NGOs.  Consequently, not only does much of 
the money donated returns to the donor country, but also the government 
employees do not have the opportunity to learn those functions themselves.  
Alternatively, the most talented among them are frequently hired away by the 
agencies, further undermining the ability of government to fulfill its responsibilities 
and fostering increased dependence on donors.30,31  “Per capita GDP of Africans 
living south of the Sahara declined at an average annual rate of 0.59 percent 
between 1975 and 2000.  Over that period, per capita GDP…declined from 
$1,770 in constant 1995 international dollars to $1,479.”28  Income per capita in 
the region was reduced by 14.6 percent from 1965 to 1986; in the 1980‟s alone, 
per capita income fell from $621 in 1981 to $352 in 1987,32  even though over 
$500 billion in aid was made available to Africa from 1960 to 1997.28  The Cato 
Institute article cited above goes on to quote Senegalese president Abdoulaye 
Wade as saying “I‟ve never seen a country develop itself through aid or credit.”28  
The failure of development efforts are not limited to Africa.  According to Manji 
and O‟Coill, in 1960 “the average income of the top 20 per cent of the world‟s 
population was 30 times that of the bottom 20 per cent,” whereas in 1997, it was 
74 times higher.33  The gap between the rich and poor continues to increase, 
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despite the fact that the U.S. alone had a foreign aid budget of $11 billion in 
2002.34  
Why has foreign aid been so destructive for so many countries?  Better 
yet, perhaps one should first ask why governments and multilateral organizations 
continue to provide foreign aid at all?  Who gets the bulk of it and why?  How can 
it be better managed?  Hundreds of thousands of books and papers have been 
written on the subject of foreign aid, also called official development assistance 
(ODA).  It is generally recognized that aid to foreign countries is heavily weighted 
in favor of those countries receiving military aid or that figure prominently in U.S. 
economic and foreign policy considerations rather than toward those who need it 
most.31,35-37  An even more sinister notion is that the U.S. and other Western 
governments, in partnership with corporate, military, economic and intelligence 
networks, intentionally set out to ensnare foreign governments by promoting 
massive industrial projects in their countries.  Such projects often largely benefit 
the corporate interests whose own experts oversee the construction and provide 
“technical assistance,” the cost of which must be borne by the “recipient” 
governments.38,39  Even when the conspiracy theory aspect of these associations 
is not advanced, there is the general acceptance that the overarching motivation 
for U.S. foreign aid is to promote the political, ideological and economic interests 
of the government and its corporate allies.  The paradigm of the mega-
corporation with intimate links to politicians and media outlets is quite familiar to 
Americans; one has only to mention the oil industry to see that this is so.  The so-
called “Green Revolution” is another example of the questionable motivation of 
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foreign aid.  While there were a number of successes in increasing crop yields in 
poor countries, reportedly saving many from starvation, the consequences for 
recipient countries included environmental degradation, increased debt, social 
instability, and unwanted industrialization.  In India, for example, pressure was 
placed on the government to allow U.S. industry to build large new fertilizer 
plants, one of which was in the now well known city of Bhopal.40  Even those who 
ascribe the impetus for foreign aid to more altruistic motives often become 
frustrated by the bureaucratic inefficiencies, administrative requirements, 
duplication of effort and lack of accountability for results that are endemic to large 
aid agencies.41  Another frustration expressed by aid experts, government 
officials and development agencies, as well as the general public, is that even 
development assistance targeted to the neediest countries, for example those in 
sub-Saharan Africa, has not reached the intended recipients.  Corruption and 
poor governance, sometimes in combination, are major causes of this 
“leakage.”28-30   In recent years, there has been an increasing focus on tying aid 
to economic and governance reforms.  An important question to ask in a 
discussion of this nature is, of course, who defines how the economies and 
governments in developing nations should function, especially in this age of 
globalization. 
 
The World Bank, Neoliberalism, and NGOs 
The World Bank has made no secret of its macroeconomic policy agenda.  
For decades both the World Bank and its partner the International Monetary 
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Fund (IMF) have recommended a set of economic policies that support a free 
market system and include a number of other fiscal policies that we would readily 
identify as being associated with laissez-faire capitalist economies, such as 
deregulation, free trade, and “less government” in general.  This  political and 
economic philosophy, known as neoliberalism, is also frequently referred to as 
the “Washington Consensus” due to its association with the policies of the World 
Bank, the IMF, and the U.S. government, particularly during the Reagan 
era.37,42,43  One well known tool that was employed by the Bank and IMF in 
promoting those policies in the developing world, especially in the 1980‟s, was 
the structural adjustment program (SAP).  SAPs were what one might call an 
economic transition plan; a set of changes designed to align the recipient 
country‟s policies with those recommended by the Bank.  Loans were provided to 
less developed countries on condition of the recipient country implementing the 
SAP.31,41  Upon implementation of this tool, it was understood that there would be 
a period of some economic turmoil until the policies had a chance to work, at 
which point economic stability would be restored.  As is so often the case, poor 
and low income citizens bore the brunt of the adjustment period, and their 
suffering did not go unnoticed by policy analysts, although many of them blamed 
leaders of debtor countries rather than the SAPs. To add insult to injury, these 
program loans frequently did not accomplish what they were designed to do, 
either in terms of economic outcomes or, later, to promote “good governance” 
practices.  Instead, they imposed an enormous burden of debt on the 
governments in question.41  Demonstrations and riots in several African and Latin 
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American countries brought the issues to prime time news coverage as well.  
According to one source, there were 146 protests in 39 countries around the 
world between 1976 and 1992.33  The neoliberal paradigm was under fire; the 
neoliberals found it increasingly difficult to defend their model.  Capitalism was in 
crisis.44  In 1987, UNICEF released a highly publicized critique of the SAP 
approach, entitled Adjustment With a Human Face, followed shortly thereafter by 
the first Human Development Report, published in 1990 by the United Nations 
Development Program‟s (UNDP), in which it outlined its sustainable human 
development (SHD) model.  The two documents contained similar themes.42,43  
Gore notes that: 
The key feature of the sustainable human development approach 
which distinguishes it from the Washington Consensus, is that it 
espouses a different set of values. Whereas the Washington 
Consensus focuses on the promotion of GDP growth, and has been 
implemented through a top-down, donor-conditionality-driven and 
outside-expert-led, approach, the sustainable human development 
approach argues that the ultimate test of development practice is that 
it should improve the nature of people‟s lives, and advocates that it 
should be founded on participation and a more equal partnership 
between developing countries and aid donors.42 
 
The traditional approach to development was seen by many as a 
failure.33,41  It was in this policy environment that non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) found fertile ground for expansion and growth both in numbers and in 
size.45,46  NGOs were seen as a positive alternative to the cumbersome, 
ineffective top-down model of the past.  Bilateral aid agencies and multilateral 
donors, either recognizing an opportunity to polish their reputations or seeking 
support for their agendas (or both), began to make funds available to NGOs on a 
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much larger scale than before.46,47  Official funding comprised less than two 
percent of NGO income in the early 1970s but increased to thirty percent by the 
1990s,33 and the upward trend has continued into the next century. 
Not coincidentally, the World Bank underwent a very public paradigm shift 
in the 1990s.  There emerged a greater focus on poverty reduction as being 
central to development efforts; it was “a more pragmatic, holistic approach.”43  
The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Debt Initiative, which provided debt 
relief to developing countries commensurate with their own efforts at 
implementing internal poverty alleviation programs, was launched by the Bank in 
1996.  In 1999, Wolfensohn unveiled a “new model” for development, which was 
called the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF).  As part of the CDF, 
those countries receiving debt relief under the HIPC initiative would now be 
asked to complete poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs).  The Bank called 
on all those in the aid community to support its strategy.  Now calling itself a 
“Knowledge Bank,” the institution would lend its expertise to debtor countries.  
This would allow these countries to retain “ownership” of their poverty programs 
along with the “participation of civil society, and consultation with donor countries 
and NGOs”48 (emphasis mine).  The unspoken proviso is that all of these players, 
NGOs included, are expected to buy in to the policy framework promoted by the 
Bank.  Cammack goes on to say that this “new policy approach” is not new at all.  
It is, in essence, the same neoliberal agenda repackaged.  He draws extensively 
from a Bank publication entitled Poverty, published in 1990 as part of its World 
Development Report, as well as from a sampling of other documents published 
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throughout the decade, to support his argument.  The difference in the new 
versus the old strategy, he asserts, is that the former is more comprehensive; 
incorporating a systems approach, promoting social structures and institutions 
that create an enabling “environment for the sustainable reproduction of 
capitalism.”48  Townsend, et al., agree that “with the rise of the post-Washington 
consensus, ideas of participation and „bottom up‟ development were re-fashioned 
as policy tools.”47  The underlying motive for the increased attention to poverty 
alleviation, then, was to enlist the poor as allies (or pawns as the cynic might say) 
in the effort to transform their societies into hospitable environments for capitalist 
structures.  What the poor have to contribute is their labor.48  If they do not have 
their core survival needs met, along with basic education, nutrition, family 
planning and health care services, their capacity to work is limited.  Finally, 
Cammack says, the Bank “implicitly recognizes, in its targets for the reduction 
rather than the elimination of absolute poverty, that a third layer of the absolutely 
poor will continue to exist, as a reservoir for further workers.”48  Others have 
agreed with Cammack‟s assessment.  Sandbrook asserted that, along with the 
IMF and the World Trade Organization, the Bank had merely “supplemented their 
neoclassical economic doctrine with a declared commitment to poverty reduction, 
gender equity, enhanced participation, pluralism, human rights and 
partnership”43.  Gore called it “neoliberal populism”42  and Weber coined the term 
“global development architecture.”44     
What is most relevant to this paper, of course, is the relationship of the 
neoliberal policies of the World Bank to microfinance as a tool for poverty 
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alleviation.  It is through Weber‟s theory that we return to this topic.  As noted, 
she employs the metaphor of architecture in her discussion.  Architecture implies 
a complete, unified structure, not just a foundation or a frame.  Her argument, like 
Cammack‟s, is that the World Bank‟s new poverty focus is a means to an end, 
rather than an end in itself.  In setting out her particular argument, however, she 
emphasizes the Bank‟s endorsement of microcredit as a poverty reduction tool, 
and examines the motivation behind it. 
Closer scrutiny suggests that microcredit may be motivated primarily 
by its capacity to perform a „dual function‟ in the global political 
economy. Firstly, as a financially steered targeted poverty reduction 
strategy, microcredit, via its implications for policy, facilitates financial 
sector liberalisation as well as extending the policy of trade in 
financial services to the local level. Secondly, microcredit minimalism 
has a disciplinary potential that renders it particularly conducive to 
functioning as a political safety-net. In the latter case, it offsets 
„income-insecurity‟ and attempts to absorb surplus labour in growing 
informal sectors. Appropriated as a political safety-net, microcredit via 
its disciplinary potential dampens or contains resistance to the 
implementation of neoliberal policies at local levels.44 
 
In 1995, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) was founded by 
development banks along with foreign governments to focus on microfinance as 
a poverty alleviation strategy.49  However, many feel the organization is only a 
mouthpiece for the World Bank.  (In fact, after critics pointed out that calling itself 
the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest was disingenuous, they changed 
“Poorest” to “Poor.”)  These two organizations, CGAP and the World Bank, are 
recognized as being largely responsible for disseminating the guidelines for 
global best practices in microfinance, specifically, as Weber notes repeatedly, for 
“microcredit minimalism.”  She goes on to assert that “NGOs as potential 
financial intermediaries to the poor are subject to status revision by the CGAP 
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and donor community for best practice.”44  Unfortunately for my purposes, Weber 
does not elaborate on the distinction between the minimalist approach and the 
integrated approach.  Neither does she pursue the implications of the pressure 
on NGOs to conform.  Others do, however.  It is not surprising that some are 
skeptical of the independence of NGOs given the observation that the “post-
Washington consensus” has drawn “the state, the private sector and the 
third/nonprofit section into new and closer relations of partnership…..in which the 
space of government extends far beyond the formal aspects of the state.”47  One 
implication of the close relationship between NGOs and official donors is that 
NGOs have the potential to lose their credibility both with social activists and their 
clients46 due to their perceived shift in role from partner to contractor.45  Another 
is that their mission may become bogged down in administrative requirements 
and bureaucratic inefficiencies.45  There is also the danger that NGOs may buy in 
to donor definitions and measures of success.  For example, one of the 
development buzz words is empowerment, specifically pertaining to women.  
However, the picture of empowerment is painted differently by the World Bank 
than it is by gender activists and independent NGOs.50  Empowerment, according 
to Townsend, et al, “requires the undoing of internalized oppression”; it is, 
therefore, “self-empowerment” and is a “process, not an output.”47  This question 
of women‟s empowerment has been yet another source of friction among those 
in the microfinance development community.  Some critics see women as being 
exploited by microfinance institutions in a number of ways, including: the use of 
their time to act as mutual collection agents; increasing their risk of loss of social 
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capital in the event of loan default; adding to their already high workload; and by 
not recognizing that they often do not have control over the money they are 
lent.51  On the other hand, even NGOs who receive a great deal of official funding 
often “create spaces of resistance” to the neoliberal agenda.47  Because group-
based lending to women is the predominant model of microcredit lending, 
microfinance offers women an opportunity to come together.  For many, simply 
becoming a member of a group can be an inherently empowering experience, if 
only by virtue of the fact that it gives them more mobility in their environments.  
An NGO that has as its core mission women‟s empowerment, though, can 
maximize the impact of these gatherings to advance the gender equality agenda 
through educational programs, interactive workshops and other services; in other 
words, an integrated program.   
 
How, then, shall we live? 
Are there examples of programs that operate as just described above?  
Yes, there are.  How do they fare, then, in terms of the sustainability factor?  As 
alluded to earlier in this paper, there are a number of poverty focused programs 
that are at or near financial self-sufficiency.  One might point to Freedom from 
Hunger‟s (FFH) Credit With Education (CWE) as the “gold standard” of financially 
self-sufficient, integrated programs.  FFH is not a new face on the NGO scene.  It 
was first established as a relief agency in 1946 under the name Meals for 
Millions, and was best known for sponsoring the development of the Multi-
Purpose Food (MPF) supplement that was widely distributed in Europe during 
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the post-war famine.  The organization changed its name to Freedom from 
Hunger in 1987 and became involved in microfinance in 1988,52 when the 
movement was still in its relative infancy.  Credit with Education operates as a 
unified, self-financing service delivery organization.  That is to say, the same staff 
administers both the financial and the educational services, in addition to which 
the institution is financially self-sufficient.  Along with basic education on 
microenterprise management and group lending dynamics, CWE focuses 
specifically on health education, although other organizations include many other 
topics.17  Because Freedom from Hunger‟s CWE lending programs are group-
based, borrowers assemble at regular (generally weekly or biweekly) meetings 
where they make payments and discuss any issues, both problems and lessons 
learned.  CWE field staff attend these meetings to oversee the financial 
transactions, as well as to present their educational sessions.  Presentations 
generally last about thirty minutes and contain general information on health and 
nutrition; the staff are not experts, but rather knowledgeable conduits for 
information.  Sometimes the field agent will provide information about a topic, 
and then provide referrals to local services.  Family planning is a good example 
of this since there may be strict guidelines as to what type of provider is 
authorized to dispense family planning methods.  However, in two of its 
sponsored programs, FOCCAS (Foundation for Credit and Community 
Assistance) in Uganda and CRECER (Credito con Educacion Rural) in Bolivia, 
CWE has expanded its purely educational scope to include provision of family 
planning methods.17  In the case of Uganda, HIV prevention education is 
 Sandra R Brady 27 
combined with the family planning topic.  As one would expect, the local public 
health priority often dictates the topic selection, as does the availability of 
services.  During the course of the loan cycle, which is typically four to six 
months, there will be one or two topics that are presented in depth, and the 
weekly sessions often build on the previous one.  As Dunford points out, adult 
education, in order to be effective, must be interactive, and must build on the 
knowledge and experience of the participants.  Therefore, field agents must “be 
carefully recruited, trained and supervised” in order to be effective adult 
educators.17  Freedom from Hunger has implemented successful CWE programs 
in at least fifteen countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.52  In two of those 
countries, Ghana and Bolivia, multi-year impact assessment studies have been 
conducted comparing women who had been in the CWE program for one to 
three years to women who were not program participants.  Evaluators looked at 
the programs impact on women‟s empowerment, health, nutrition and economic 
indicators.  They collected data on the value the women placed on the 
educational programs.  Financial benefits measures included increased income 
due to business expansions, increased asset, and a decrease in food insecurity.  
Some of the health benefits included an improvement in breastfeeding practices, 
better methods of diarrhea control, and an increase in the completion of full 
immunization series for children.  It was found that participants‟ children had a 
significantly higher caloric intake and overall dietary quality, with better nutritional 
status in general, than those of non-participants.  In terms of value placed on the 
education, it was recognized that without having experienced a credit “without” 
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education program, the women would have difficulty gauging its value.  However, 
one interesting anecdote speaks volumes.  Recently in Bolivia, there was a 
“renunciation of debt” protest, at which time borrowers were being encouraged to 
default as a political statement.  CRECER Bolivia clients refused to participate.  
“When asked why, many clients told CRECER staff, „CRECER cares about us.  
They are not here just to collect our loans.  They talk with us and give us 
education.‟”17  Regarding the empowerment impacts, women in the program self-
reported an improvement in their self-confidence and their perceived status in the 
community as a result of participating in the program.  However, one 
disappointing finding was that there was little evidence of any change in power 
relationships within the household.17  This is not surprising, however, given that 
the program does not focus specifically on gender equality issues, which I will 
discuss further in a later paragraph.  Dunford is the first to point out that the 
financially self-sufficient, integrated model is not for every institution.  It requires a 
combination of unwavering commitment to reaching the poorest along with a 
focused intent to be free of any donor dependency.  It is, he believes, largely a 
matter of will.17 
Freedom from Hunger is a large, well-established organization that 
operates globally.  Let us look, by contrast, at a small, local group that has 
managed to “do something useful.”  Fortaleza, Brazil, is the capital city of the 
state of Ceara and a popular tourist destination.  It sits on the coast in 
northeastern Brazil and boasts beautiful white-sand beaches and glittering 
nightlife.  City leaders became concerned, however, that the large slum area, 
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situated near the beach, would cause tourism to suffer.  In 1973, 1,500 poor 
families were resettled twenty kilometers outside the town in an uninhabited area.  
Conjunto Palmeiras, as it was called, was, in effect, an artificially created slum.  
There was no electricity, sanitation or water supply, and little transportation to the 
city for work.  By the end of the decade, there were about 30,000 inhabitants 
living in squalid conditions with little hope for the future.  However, in 1981, a 
neighborhood association called ASMOCONP (Associacao dos Moradores do 
Conjunto Palmeiras) was formed with the support of the Catholic Church and 
local and international NGOs.  The initial efforts of the group centered around 
raising money for infrastructure improvements and lobbying efforts.  They were 
able to obtain funds from a German government-owned corporation that 
specialized in sustainable development projects.  By 1998, Conjunto Palmeiras 
had water, sewer, electricity and paved streets.  Unfortunately, the city then 
wanted to levy higher taxes on people who could ill afford to pay, and residents 
began leaving the community.  ASMOCONP shifted its focus to economic 
development, creating a microfinance institution they called Banco Palmas, with 
about $1,800  in seed funding donated by an indigenous NGO.  Banco Palmas 
was founded on the idea of local capacity building, of generating capital locally 
and keeping it local.  The mechanisms for accomplishing this were threefold; they 
created their own local currency, dubbed “social currency;” they made 
professional training their highest priority; and they created a map of local 
production and consumption.  Within six months of the organization‟s founding, 
they had raised an additional $27,000 to fund their dream.  
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The local currency, called the Palma, was backed by an equal amount of 
Brazilian reals held at Banco Palmas.  The bank would convert the money, but 
charged a two percent conversion fee.  Borrowers received their loans in Palmas 
and the bank charged no interest.  This currency was accepted at businesses in 
Palmeira, but, of course, nowhere else, which encouraged local trade.  In order 
to provide training to residents, the bank set up so-called solidarity businesses.  
These were small businesses set up on bank property specifically for the 
purpose of serving as training environments where citizens could learn valuable 
business skills and useful trades.  These were actual operating businesses and 
were financially self-sufficient as such.  For example, there was a sewing factory, 
a cleaning products factory and a handicraft products business, among others.  
In combination with the solidarity businesses, they created a training program 
targeting residents from the ages of 16 to 24.  Essentially, it was an 
apprenticeship where both the business and the learner received a small grant 
during the training period, at the end of which the trainee was often hired.  The 
third component of the strategy was pure genius.  Each year, the bank 
commissioned a Local Consumption and Production Map, “detailed...information 
about how much of each different item typically consumed in households is being 
produced and consumed in the community.”53  Not only did this give residents 
information about where to shop for needed items, but it also allowed them to 
make informed decisions about what sort of businesses might be needed.  The 
bank used the data to make decisions about what projects to fund: 
the idea is to adjust the quantities being produced to the local 
demand…..this helps to overcome a weakness often attributed to 
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minimalist microcredit programs that finance individual micro-
businesses, whereby local markets may end up saturated, therefore 
causing existing competitors to collapse or be displaced.”53   
 
At one point the community determined that young people were spending a great 
deal of time traveling back and forth to the city for computer classes, so it was 
decided that a computer school was needed.  Only one merchant, a local grocer, 
had a facility large enough and with enough capacity to house it.  Therefore, the 
local grocery owner suddenly became the manager of a computer school.  This is 
an excellent example of how the concept of solidarity groups, an integrated 
approach, worked within this community.  They planned and acted as a 
collective, and everyone has benefited.  At this point, the organization still 
receives support from development agencies, NGOs and even the university 
community.  So can we say that it is successful?  The question, really, is how can 
we not? 
Despite these very successful examples, however, and as alluded to 
above, women‟s empowerment remains an area in need of more focus by 
microfinance organizations, and by the development community as a whole.  
One of the Millennium Development goals is specifically to promote gender 
equality and women‟s empowerment.  As quoted in Mayoux, the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council in 1993 defined gender mainstreaming as: 
the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any 
planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in any 
area and at all levels.  It is a strategy for making women‟s as well as 
men‟s concerns and experiences an integral dimension in the design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and 
programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that 
women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.  
The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.54   
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In practice, this means that all organizations, including microfinance institutions, 
should take a critical look at their programs to evaluate their impact on power 
relations among men and women in the household, the community and in society 
at large.  Despite the minimalist claims that access to microcredit automatically 
empowers women, there are a number of studies that have demonstrated that 
the opposite can be true.47,54-56  Still, minimalist MFIs shy away from gender 
mainstreaming because they worry that the resources needed to create an 
education program specifically designed to address gender equality issues will 
threaten their ability to remain financially self-sufficient;51 nevertheless they target 
women “as an efficiency strategy to increase credit recovery”54 because women 
have proven to be more reliable in terms of debt repayment.  Some gender 
equality advocates argue that these programs need not be expensive and that 
there are MFIs who maintain financial self-sufficiency along with a focus on 
gender mainstreaming.51  Others argue that the minimalists must be addressed 
in a “language that they understand” and be made to recognize that a failure to 
address gender issues “affects their own prospects for retaining…..their 
clients….and hence their own financial performance in increasingly competitive 
environments.”56   
Despite the complexity of the topic and the apparent difficulty in measuring 
women‟s empowerment,56 there are some encouraging examples of microfinance 
institutions who have successfully incorporated gender mainstreaming into their 
programs.  Moreover, some of those also exhibit strong financial performance.  
Women‟s World Banking (WWB) is a global microfinance organization 
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established following the first United Nations World Conference on Women in 
1975.  They focus heavily on interactive education for women; they conduct a 
Women‟s Leadership Development Program aimed at preparing women for 
leadership roles in the microfinance industry and elsewhere.57  Their affiliate, 
ADOPEM, in the Dominican Republic boasts financially self-sufficiency.  Not only 
do they offer business training, however, but they also offer classes in the 
democratic process and “civil society participation designed to encourage 
women‟s empowerment and leadership.”51  Although not all of their affiliates are 
fully sustainable, WWB has cultivated partnerships with banking and financial 
institutions who provide valuable skills training to their field staff.57  Sinapi Aba 
Trust (SAT), an Opportunity International affiliate working at the village level in 
Ghana, has a client base of 93% women and provides education on business 
skills, marketing, and social and community issues.  They operate 16 branch 
locations throughout Ghana and, as of 2002, had almost 23,000 clients and were 
financially self-sufficient.  In addition, SAT “makes a deliberate effort to provide 
women with skills and advice that will allow them to cope with the competing 
pressures of their domestic responsibilities and their businesses as well as 
working with them on communication and relationship skills.”51  As part of an SAT 
impact assessment, a series of structured interviews were held with long term (2-
6 years) clients and their husbands; a total of 1,200 people were interviewed.  
Although some women admitted to hiding their increased earnings from their 
husbands for fear he would reduce his own financial contribution, the majority, 
both men and women, reported improved relations in the household.  They also 
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found that women were making their own business decisions and that men were 
doing more to help with domestic responsibilities.51  The Self-Employed Women‟s 
Association (SEWA) is a very different type of organization from the usual MFI.  
SEWA employs microcredit lending as part of a larger strategy of “social and 
political empowerment.”54  As their website states, they are both an organization 
and a movement.   
The SEWA movement is enhanced by its being a sangam or 
confluence of three movements: the labour movement, the 
cooperative movement and the women‟s movement. But it is also a 
movement of self-employed workers: their own, home-grown 
movement with women as the leaders. Through their own movement 
women become strong and visible. Their tremendous economic and 
social contributions become recognized.58 
  
Organized as a trade union in 1972 to advance the rights of self-employed 
women, they are also involved in microcredit and savings programs, agricultural 
cooperatives, and health care programs.58  They also serve as a link to lobbying 
and advocacy organizations,54 promoting empowerment as a citizen and as a 
human being, at the level of being heard, of being a full participant in human 
society.   
 
Conclusions 
The cases described in the section above represent very different 
organizational structures, operational methods, and financial situations.  Yet they 
all embody a similar vision, that of the alleviation of poverty and the unimaginable 
human suffering it causes.   I say “unimaginable” and yet those of us who hope 
for a better world must imagine it, even as we imagine a way forward.  Impact 
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assessment methods have improved and now encompass sound qualitative 
methods.  Therefore, organizations are better able to demonstrate a social return 
rather than having to rely solely on financial metrics (some of which have been 
artificially constructed and yielded no useful information).  There is not one single 
way to effect social change; there is not one single set of “best practices” that 
applies in all situations.  Rather there must be a better definition of success, one 
that does not prostrate itself before an economic ideology or a political agenda.  
Success should be defined by those whose lives we seek to improve.  We must 
embrace a “global” approach with all of the positive associations of that word and 
none of the negative ones, the ones that conjure up images of imperialist 
policies. 
In some sense, we might say that this paper is being written about three or 
four years too soon.  The economic crisis that began affecting the world in 2008 
has yet to reveal all of its lessons.  The fallout from unfettered free markets and 
self-regulation of the financial industry is only beginning.  Clearly there is deep 
disillusionment regarding the financial practices of the past.  Perhaps, 
recognizing that the prevailing philosophy of economic development is seriously 
flawed, the World Bank and its partners in the development community will 
undergo a period of genuine organizational soul searching.  It will be interesting 
to follow the work of those referenced in this paper to see what they will have to 
say on the subject in years to come.  One article published in October, 2008, co-
authored by David Hulme, with whose work I have become quite familiar while 
researching this paper, has pointed out, perhaps somewhat wryly, that the 
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“perception that microfinance operations are somehow riskier than the operations 
of the more established banking sector….has clearly been proved wrong.”14   
 
______________________________ 
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